By 2023, the world held about 1,245 tons of highly enriched uranium and about 641 tons of plutonium when military and civilian stocks are combined. Russia’s HEU military stockpile was estimated at 618 tons, while the U.S. held roughly 274 tons in military HEU and about 585 tons in civilian HEU. Since 1996, downblending has cut global HEU stocks by 15 percent, even as fissile material remains concentrated and security gaps can still drive proliferation risk.
Key Takeaways
- US highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile: ~274 tons military, ~585 tons civilian as of 2023
- Russia HEU military stockpile estimated at 618 tons in 2023
- Global HEU stockpile total ~1,245 tons in 2023
- Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has 191 states parties as of 2023
- NPT entered into force on March 5, 1970
- Five nuclear-weapon states recognized by NPT: US, Russia, UK, France, China
- As of 2023, the global inventory of nuclear warheads is approximately 12,121
- Russia possesses 5,889 nuclear warheads in military stockpiles as of early 2023
- The United States has 5,244 nuclear warheads in military stockpiles as of 2023
- The United States conducted 1,054 nuclear tests from 1945 to 1992
- Soviet Union/Russia performed 715 nuclear tests between 1949 and 1990
- France carried out 210 nuclear tests from 1960 to 1996
- A.Q. Khan network supplied centrifuge tech to Iran, Libya, North Korea
- Iran's breakout time to 25kg weapons-grade U-235 reduced to days by 2023
- North Korea fissile material for 40-50 warheads by 2023 despite sanctions
In 2023, global HEU and plutonium stocks topped 1,780 tons while about 12,121 nuclear warheads remained worldwide.
Related reading
01 · Category
Fissile Materials23 stats
01
US highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile: ~274 tons military, ~585 tons civilian as of 2023
02
Russia HEU military stockpile estimated at 618 tons in 2023
03
Global HEU stockpile total ~1,245 tons in 2023
04
Plutonium global stockpile: 535 tons military, 106 tons civilian in 2023
05
US plutonium stockpile: 87.6 tons in 2023
06
Russia plutonium: 148 tons declared in 2023
07
France plutonium stock: 69 tons in 2023
08
UK plutonium: 139 tons mostly civilian
09
China HEU estimated 20 tons, plutonium 4 tons in 2023
10
India plutonium ~0.7 tons weapons-grade
11
Pakistan HEU ~0.45 tons, plutonium small amounts
12
Israel plutonium ~0.3 tons estimated
13
North Korea plutonium ~0.08 tons, HEU ~1-2 tons by 2023
14
Global civilian plutonium reprocessing: Japan 9 tons/year capacity
15
US Megatons to Megawatts program downblended 500 tons HEU 1993-2013
16
Russia declared 500 tons excess HEU for downblending in 1996
17
IAEA safeguards 1,100 tons HEU civilian globally
18
Iran's enriched uranium stockpile exceeded 5,500 kg UF6 by Nov 2023
19
Libya's HEU removed by US in 2004 under Libya program
20
Syria's Al-Kibar reactor destroyed 2007, potential plutonium path
21
Global HEU downblending reduced stocks by 15% since 1996
22
South Africa produced 6 bombs from 400g Pu each before 1991 dismantlement
23
Iraq's pre-1991 centrifuge program aimed at 10-20 kg HEU/year
Interpretation
Fissile Materials Interpretation
As of 2023, the world holds roughly 1,245 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU)—with the U.S. leading at 274 tons military and 585 tons civilian, Russia at 618 tons military, and smaller but still significant amounts in China (20 tons HEU), India (~0.7 tons weapons-grade plutonium), Pakistan (~0.45 tons HEU), and others—paired with 641 tons of military plutonium (535 global, 87.6 in the U.S.) and 106 tons of civilian plutonium, though Japan’s 9 tons/year reprocessing capacity and downblending efforts like the U.S.-Russia Megatons to Megawatts program (which downblended 500 tons between 1993–2013) and Russia’s 500 tons of excess HEU (declared 1996 for downblending) have cut global HEU stocks by 15% since 1996; yet, Iran’s over 5,500 kg of enriched uranium UF6 (by November 2023), Syria’s destroyed Al-Kibar reactor (2007, with potential plutonium ties), and historical risks like Iraq’s pre-1991 centrifuge program (aiming for 10–20 kg HEU annually) and South Africa’s 6 bombs (made from 400g of plutonium each before dismantlement in 1991) underscore the fragile balance between progress and peril, with the IAEA safeguarding 1,100 tons of civilian HEU globally.
02 · Category
Non-Proliferation Treaties18 stats
01
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has 191 states parties as of 2023
02
NPT entered into force on March 5, 1970
03
Five nuclear-weapon states recognized by NPT: US, Russia, UK, France, China
04
India, Israel, Pakistan are non-signatories to NPT
05
North Korea withdrew from NPT in January 2003
06
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has 187 signatories, 177 ratifications as of 2023
07
CTBT opened for signature September 24, 1996, not yet in force
08
New START Treaty between US and Russia extended to 2026
09
New START limits deployed strategic warheads to 1,550 each
10
Treaty of Tlatelolco established Latin America NWFZ in 1967, 33 parties
11
Treaty of Rarotonga for South Pacific NWFZ: 13 parties since 1985
12
Pelindaba Treaty for Africa NWFZ entered force 2009, 41 parties
13
Central Asia NWFZ (Semipalatinsk Treaty) 5 parties since 2009
14
NPT Review Conferences held every 5 years, latest 2022 unsuccessful
15
Iran signed NPT in 1968, ratified 1970, under IAEA safeguards
16
South Africa dismantled nukes and joined NPT in 1991
17
Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan transferred Soviet nukes to Russia post-1991, joined NPT
18
Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations stalled since 1995
Interpretation
Non-Proliferation Treaties Interpretation
The NPT, which entered force in 1970 and now counts 191 states, acknowledges five nuclear-weapon states but leaves India, Israel, and Pakistan unbound—with North Korea having withdrawn in 2003—while the CTBT, signed by 187 but ratified by only 177 (and thus still not in force), and the 2022 NPT review conference (the fifth in 30 years) failing to advance; meanwhile, New START, limiting each side to 1,550 deployed strategic warheads, was extended to 2026, regional nuclear-weapon-free zones (Latin America, South Pacific, Africa, Central Asia) have varying numbers of members, Iran remains under IAEA safeguards (having joined in 1968), South Africa dismantled its nukes to join in 1991, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan handed over Soviet-era nukes to Russia and then joined, and talks on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty have been stuck since 1995—proving nuclear disarmament and control is a delicate, ever-unfinished game.
03 · Category
Nuclear Stockpiles25 stats
01
As of 2023, the global inventory of nuclear warheads is approximately 12,121
02
Russia possesses 5,889 nuclear warheads in military stockpiles as of early 2023
03
The United States has 5,244 nuclear warheads in military stockpiles as of 2023
04
China maintains about 410 nuclear warheads as of 2023
05
France holds 290 operational nuclear warheads in 2023
06
The UK has 225 nuclear warheads as of 2023
07
India possesses an estimated 172 nuclear warheads in 2023
08
Pakistan has around 170 nuclear warheads as of 2023
09
Israel is estimated to have 90 nuclear warheads in 2023
10
North Korea has approximately 30 nuclear warheads assembled as of 2023
11
In 2022, global nuclear warheads totaled 12,700
12
US deployed strategic warheads numbered 1,419 under New START as of 2023
13
Russia deployed strategic warheads were 1,549 under New START in 2023
14
Global deployed warheads on missiles stood at 3,708 in 2023
15
Retired US warheads awaiting dismantlement: about 1,336 in 2023
16
China's nuclear arsenal grew by 90 warheads from 2022 to 2023
17
France's total warheads remained stable at 290 from 2022-2023
18
UK's warhead stockpile ceiling raised to 260 in 2021, holding 225 in 2023
19
India's arsenal increased to 172 warheads by 2023
20
Pakistan added 10 warheads to reach 170 in 2023
21
North Korea's fissile material sufficient for 30-40 warheads in 2023
22
Total global warheads peaked at ~70,000 in 1986
23
US total inventory peaked at 31,255 in 1967
24
Soviet Union peaked at 40,000 warheads in 1986
25
Global stockpiles declined by 83% from 1989 peak to 2023
Interpretation
Nuclear Stockpiles Interpretation
As of 2023, the world still hovers under a cloud of roughly 12,121 nuclear warheads—far fewer than the 1986 peak of 70,000, but still a staggering number—with Russia (5,889) and the U.S. (5,244) holding the lion’s share, followed by China (410), France (290), the UK (225), India (172), Pakistan (170), Israel (90), and North Korea (30); China grew by 90 warheads this year, the U.S. and Russia shrink under New START (1,419 and 1,549 deployed strategic warheads, respectively), and global stockpiles have plummeted 83% since 1989, a fragile balance of deterrence and disarmament in a century where progress toward peace feels as fragile as a match in the wind.
More related reading
04 · Category
Nuclear Testing22 stats
01
The United States conducted 1,054 nuclear tests from 1945 to 1992
02
Soviet Union/Russia performed 715 nuclear tests between 1949 and 1990
03
France carried out 210 nuclear tests from 1960 to 1996
04
United Kingdom conducted 45 nuclear tests from 1952 to 1991
05
China exploded 45 nuclear devices from 1964 to 1996
06
India detonated 6 nuclear tests in 1974 and 1998
07
Pakistan conducted 6 nuclear tests in 1998
08
North Korea has performed 6 nuclear tests since 2006, latest in 2017
09
Total nuclear tests worldwide: 2,056 by end of 1996
10
US tests in Nevada: 928 from 1951-1992
11
Soviet Semipalatinsk test site: 456 explosions
12
France's Pacific tests: 193 at Moruroa and Fangataufa
13
UK's Christmas Island tests: 9 atmospheric in 1957-58
14
China's Lop Nor site hosted all 45 tests
15
India's Pokhran-II tests in 1998: 5 devices totaling 45 kt yield
16
Pakistan's Chagai-I: 5 tests on May 28, 1998, yield 40 kt
17
North Korea's first test on Oct 9, 2006: yield ~1 kt
18
Total atmospheric tests: 528 before 1963 PTBT
19
US largest test: Castle Bravo 15 Mt in 1954
20
Soviet Tsar Bomba: 50 Mt on Oct 30, 1961, largest ever
21
Underground tests post-1963: over 1,500 globally
22
North Korea's 2017 test yield estimated 100-250 kt
Interpretation
Nuclear Testing Interpretation
Between 1945 and 2017, humanity set off 2,056 nuclear tests: the U.S. led with 1,054 (including 928 in Nevada), the Soviet Union followed with 715 (most at Semipalatinsk), France tested 210 in the Pacific, Britain 45 (with 9 atmospheric in 1957–58 in the South Pacific), China 45 in Lop Nor, India conducted 6 tests (1974 and 1998), Pakistan 6 in 1998, and North Korea 6 from 2006 to 2017 (with its 2017 test yielding 100–250 kt); 528 of these were atmospheric before the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, including the U.S.’s 15-megaton Castle Bravo in 1954 and the Soviet Union’s 50-megaton Tsar Bomba in 1961, while over 1,500 were underground after that, a reminder that even as we’ve tried to limit proliferation, nuclear capability has spread from Cold War giants to newer actors—and the scale of that power, from tiny early tests to the world’s largest, lingers as a complex, sobering legacy.
05 · Category
Proliferation Risks21 stats
01
A.Q. Khan network supplied centrifuge tech to Iran, Libya, North Korea
02
Iran's breakout time to 25kg weapons-grade U-235 reduced to days by 2023
03
North Korea fissile material for 40-50 warheads by 2023 despite sanctions
04
Saudi Arabia expressed interest in nuclear program post-2018, potential Pakistan link
05
Turkey's Russian-built Akkuyu reactor raises proliferation concerns
06
Hezbollah acquired 50,000+ rockets, some possibly chemical-capable, near Israel border
07
2006 A.Q. Khan black market blueprints reached Iran for bomb design
08
Libya's nuclear program dismantled 2003, 4,000 components seized
09
Syria's undeclared reactor at Al-Kibar bombed by Israel 2007
10
Iraq's 1981 Osirak reactor destroyed by Israel airstrike
11
South Africa's 6 warheads voluntarily dismantled 1989-1991
12
Belarus inherited 81 SS-25 ICBMs from USSR, transferred to Russia 1996
13
Ukraine had 1,900 strategic warheads, all transferred by 1996
14
Kazakhstan returned 1,410 warheads to Russia 1992-1995
15
2010 Mumbai port seizure of missile parts for Iran proliferation
16
Iran's Natanz facility centrifuges destroyed by Stuxnet cyberattack 2010
17
North Korea exported Nodong missiles to Iran, Yemen, Syria pre-2007
18
Pakistan's Kahuta facility suspected of plutonium for 10+ bombs
19
Israel's Vela Incident 1979 suspected nuclear test with South Africa
20
Global black market HEU seizures: 3 incidents post-1993 totaling 4 kg
21
UNSCR 1540 mandates states prevent WMD proliferation since 2004, 193 UN members
Interpretation
Proliferation Risks Interpretation
From A.Q. Khan’s global black market network supplying Iran, Libya, and North Korea (with Iran cutting its nuclear breakout time to weapons-grade uranium to days and North Korea stockpiling enough fissile material for 40–50 warheads) to Saudi Arabia’s post-2018 nuclear interest (possibly linked to Pakistan), Turkey’s Russian-built Akkuyu reactor raising concerns, Hezbollah’s 50,000+ rockets near Israel (some chemical-capable), and a tangled history of destroyed reactors (Syria’s Al-Kibar, Iraq’s Osirak), voluntary disarmaments (South Africa’s 6 warheads), and former Soviet states giving up 1,900+ strategic warheads, plus Stuxnet’s 2010 strike on Iran’s Natanz, North Korea’s pre-2007 missile exports, just 3 global HEU black market seizures since 1993, and the 2004 UN mandate (UNSCR 1540) binding 193 nations to curb WMD proliferation—nuclear tension, both past and present, remains a human-made puzzle that’s as urgent as it is intricate.
Reference
Cite This Report
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APA
Stefan Wendt. (2026, February 24). Nuclear Proliferation Statistics. Gitnux. https://gitnux.org/nuclear-proliferation-statistics
MLA
Stefan Wendt. "Nuclear Proliferation Statistics." Gitnux, 24 Feb 2026, https://gitnux.org/nuclear-proliferation-statistics.
Chicago
Stefan Wendt. 2026. "Nuclear Proliferation Statistics." Gitnux. https://gitnux.org/nuclear-proliferation-statistics.
Sources & references
17 datasets cited across this report · attribution is report-level